ABSTRACT In global mobility networks, a mobile user can access roaming services using a mobile device at anytime and anywhere. However, mobile users can be vulnerable to various attacks by adversaries, because the roaming services are provided through public network. Therefore, an anonymous mobile user authentication for roaming services is an essential security issue in global mobility networks. Recently, Lee et al. pointed out the security weaknesses of a previous scheme and proposed an advanced secure anonymous authentication scheme for roaming services in global mobility networks. However, we found that the scheme proposed by Lee et al. is vulnerable to password guessing and user impersonation attacks, and that it cannot provide perfect forward secrecy and secure password altered phase. In this paper, to overcome the security weaknesses of the scheme proposed by Lee et al., we propose an improved secure anonymous authentication scheme using shared secret keys between home agent and foreign agent. In addition, we analyze the security of our proposed scheme against various attacks and prove that it provides secure mutual authentication using Burrows-Abadi-Needham logic. In addition, the formal security analysis using the broadly-accepted real-or-random (ROR) random oracle model and the formal security verification using the widely accepted automated validation of the Internet security protocols and applications tool show that the proposed scheme provides the session key security and protection against replay as well as man-in-themiddle attacks, respectively. Finally, we compare the performance of the proposed scheme with the related schemes, and the results show that the proposed scheme provides better security and comparable efficiency as compared with those for the existing schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Global mobility networks (GLOMONETs) are being expanded, the numerous mobile users can access roaming services using mobile devices at anytime and anywhere. However, because roaming services are provided through public networks, an adversary could modify, delete, replay, intercept or eavesdrop the messages transmitted in public network. For these reasons, a secure mutual authentication for roaming services has become a very important issue.
Nowadays, to ensure privacy of mobile user, many mobile user authentication schemes have been proposed for roaming services in GLOMONETs [1] - [11] . Unfortunately, numerous authentication schemes are vulnerable to various attacks such as man-in-the-middle attack, perfect forward/backward secrecy, replay attack and impersonation attack. To resolve these security weaknesses, in 2004, Zhu and Ma [7] proposed an authentication scheme with anonymity for wireless environments. However, Lee et al. [8] found that Zhu and Ma's authentication scheme cannot achieve backward secrecy and mutual authentication, and cannot withstand forgery attacks. They also proposed a security enhancement on a authentication scheme with anonymity for wireless environments. In 2008, Wu et al. [9] showed that Lee et al. ' s scheme cannot achieve anonymity and perfect backward secrecy, and proposed an improved authentication scheme. However, in 2012, Mun et al. [6] claimed that Wu et al. ' s scheme cannot achieve perfect forward secrecy and discloses the passwords of legitimate users under password guessing attack. Then, they proposed an enhanced secure anonymous authentication scheme. Recently, in 2017, Lee et al. [5] showed that Mun et al. ' s scheme fails to realize real anonymity and perfect forward secrecy, and is vulnerable to masquerading attack and man-in-the-middle attack. They also proposed advanced secure anonymous authentication scheme for roaming service in GLOMONETs.
1) THREAT MODEL
The Dolev-Yao threat (DY) model [12] is widely used in evaluating the security of a protocol. Under the DY model, any two entities can communicate over a public channel. This gives an adversary an opportunity to eavesdrop (read), modify or delete the content of the messages being transmitted over the channel. We also assume that an adversary can have a lost or stolen mobile device, and can then extract all the sensitive information stored in that device using the power analysis attacks [13] , [14] . In addition, an adversary can perform various attacks including offline password guessing attack, user impersonation attack, relay attack, man-in-the-middle attack and privileged-insider attack.
2) RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS
The contributions made in the paper are listed below:
• We analyze security weaknesses of Lee et al. 's scheme and demonstrate that it is vulnerable to password guessing and user impersonation attacks, and then we show that their scheme cannot provide perfect forward secrecy and secure password altered phase.
• To overcome these security weaknesses, we propose an enhanced secure anonymous authentication scheme for the global roaming service in GLOMONETs. The proposed scheme prevents various attacks such as password guessing attack, user impersonation attack and replay attack from malicious adversaries using a shared secret key between a foreign agent and home agent.
• The formal security analysis using the broadly-accepted Real-Or-Random (ROR) random oracle model proves that the proposed scheme provides the session key (SK) security.
• Moreover, our scheme provides secure mutual authentication and perfect forward secrecy, and we prove the secure mutual authentication of our scheme using the BAN logic. • Finally, we compare the performance of our scheme with related schemes to show its security and efficiency.
3) PAPER STRUCTURE
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section II, we review the authentication scheme of Lee et al. In Section III, we cryptanalyze the scheme of Lee et al. In Section IV, we propose a secure anonymous protocol for roaming service in GLOMONETs to withstand the security pitfalls found in the authentication scheme of Lee et al. , and then we discuss the security of our proposed scheme in Section V. In Section VI, we compare the performance of the proposed scheme with the related existing schemes. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VII.
II. REVIEW OF LEE ET AL.'s SCHEME
In this section, we review the Lee et al.'s advanced secure anonymous authentication scheme for roaming service in GLOMONETs. This scheme consists of four phases: registration, authentication and establishment of session key (AESK), session key update, and password altered. The notation used in this paper is defined in Table 1 .
A. REGISTRATION PHASE
If a new mobile user MU wants to access the roaming service, MU must register with the Home agent HA firstly. The Lee et al.'s mobile user registration phase is shown Figure 1 and the detailed step of this registration phase as follows:
Step Figure 2 and the detailed step of this AESK phase as follows:
Step 1: MU inputs password PW MU and selects two random numbers
, and MU sends
chooses a random number N F , and computes 
Finally, MU and FA achieve the session key agreement successfully.
C. SESSION KEY UPDATE PHASE
When mobile user MU wants to update the session key, MU can update the session key. The detailed step of this password change phase are follows:
Step 1: MU chooses a new random number N * M , and MU 
E. LACK OF MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION
According to Section III-B, an adversary MU a can impersonate as mobile user MU . MU a also can achieve authentication between MU a and FA. For this reason, Lee et al's scheme cannot provide secure mutual authentication.
IV. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, to resolve the security weaknesses of Lee et al.'s scheme, we propose an improved secure anonymous authentication protocol for roaming service in GLOMONETs. Our scheme consists of five phases: foreign agent (FA) registration, mobile user (MU) registration, authentication and establishment of session key (AESK), session key update and password altered phase.
A. REGISTRATION PHASE
The registration phase of the proposed scheme is composed of the following two registration phases of the foreign agent (FA) and the mobile user (MU ).
1) FOREIGN AGENT REGISTRATION PHASE
When the foreign agent FA wants to provide roaming service with home agent HA, FA sends the agent registration request message to HA in advance. The foreign agent registration phase of the proposed scheme is shown in Figure 3 and the detailed steps of this phase are as follows.
Step 1: A foreign agent FA chooses a random number b and computes k FA = h(ID FA ||b), and then sends 
FIGURE 4.
Mobile user registration phase of the proposed scheme.
Step 2: After receiving 
2) MOBILE USER REGISTRATION PHASE
When a new mobile user MU wants to use the roaming service, MU must register with the Home agent HA in advance. The proposed scheme's mobile user registration phase is shown Figure 4 and the detailed steps of this phase are as follows.
Step 1: MU chooses the identity ID MU , password PW MU and a random number s, and then computes EID = h(ID MU ⊕PW MU )⊕s and sends EID to HA through the secure channel.
Step 2: After receiving EID from MU , HA computes S = h(EID||h(SK HA )) and sends S to MU . Step 3: After receiving S from HA, MU computes
, and stores SPW and s . Consequently, the mobile device contains {SPW , s }.
B. AESK PHASE
If the mobile user MU wants to access a roaming service, MU sends request message of accessing the roaming service to foreign agent FA. AESK phase of the proposed scheme is shown in Figure 5 and the detailed steps of this AESK phase are as follows.
Step 1: MU inputs identity ID MU and password PW MU , and selects two random numbers s new and 
MU , FA chooses a random number N F , and 
C. SESSION KEY UPDATE PHASE
If a mobile user MU wants to update the session key, MU can try to update the session key as follows.
If it is equal, FA updates the session key K * MF from K MF . Finally, the session update phase is completed successfully. Session key update phase of the proposed scheme is briefed in Figure 6 .
D. PASSWORD ALTERED PHASE
In our scheme, when mobile user MU wants to alter his/her password, MU can alter his/her password freely. This phase has the following steps:
Step Step Finally, the password altered phase is completed successfully. Password altered phase of the proposed scheme is summarized in Figure 7 .
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, to prove the security of our proposed scheme, we perform the formal security analysis using the broadly-accepted Real-Or-Random (ROR) model [15] , mutual authentication proof using the the widely-accepted BAN logic [16] and also formal security verification using the broadly-used Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA) simulation [17] .
A. FORMAL SECURITY USING ROR MODEL
This section proves the session key (SK) security of the proposed scheme using the widely-accepted Real-Or-Random (ROR) model [15] .
1) ROR MODEL
In the AESK phase of the proposed scheme. we have three entities, namely, MU , FA and HA. The brief discussion on the ROR model is given below. In an instance I t goes to an accept state after receiving the final protocol message, it is said to be that it enters in accepted state. The ordered concatenation of all communications (send and received messages by I t ) is called the session identification (sid) of I t for current session. FA is said to be fresh.
e: ADVERSARY
An adversary A is modeled using the Dolev-Yao (DY) model as explained in the threat model (Section I-.1). A can eavesdrop, modify, delete or inject the messages transmitted between the entities involved during the communication with the help of the following defined queries:
The eavesdropping attack is modeled in this execute query. It allows A to eavesdrop the messages communicated among MU , FA and HA.
Send(I t , msg): This is the send query under which A transmits a message to I t , and in response, it also receives the message from I t . It is further modeled as an active attack.
Reveal(I t ): This is the reveal query that reveals the session key K MF created by I t (and its partner) to A in the current session.
CMD(I t MU ): Under this corrupt mobile device query, A can fetch all the sensitive secret credentials stored from the lost or stolen mobile device's memory using the power analysis attack [13] , [14] . This is also modeled as an active attack.
Test(I t ): Before the game begins, an unbiased coin c is flipped. Based on the output, the following decision is taken. A executes this test query and if the session key K MF between MU and FA is fresh, I t returns K MF if c = 1 or a random number if c = 0; otherwise, it returns a null value (⊥).
In our formal security analysis, we impose a restriction that A can access only a limited number of CMD(I t MU ) queries, while an unlimited number of Test(I t ) queries are accessible by A.
f: SEMANTIC SECURITY
Under the semantic security, the indistinguishability of the real session key K MF from a random number by an adversary A is necessary. The query Test(I t )'s outputs needs to be consistent with the random bit c. If A's guessed bit is c and Succ is the winning probability in the game, A's advantage in breaking the session key (SK) security of the proposed scheme, say P is denoted and defined by Adv P = 2|Pr[Succ] − 1|, where Pr[.] denotes the probability.
g: RANDOM ORACLE
The proposed scheme makes use of the one-way cryptographic hash function h(·). h(·) is modeled as a random oracle, say Hash and h(·) is public.
2) SECURITY PROOF
Wang et al. [18] mentioned that the user-chosen passwords follow the Zipf's law that is a vastly different distribution from the uniform distribution. The size of password dictionary is generally much constrained in the sense that the users will not use the whole space of passwords, but rather a small space of the allowed characters space [18] . We use the Zipf's law in proving the SK security of the proposed scheme, which is provided in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: If Adv P denotes the advantage function of an adversary A in breaking the SK security of the proposed scheme P, then
where q h , q send and |Hash| are the number of Hash queries, the number of Send queries and the range space of the hash function h(·), respectively, and C and s are the Zipf's parameters [18] . Proof: We follow the similar proof as applied in [19] - [22] . We define a sequence of four games, say GM i for i = 0, 1, 2, 3. Let Succ i be the probability associated with the game GM i in which an adversary A wins the game GM i . The detailed discussion of these four games is given below.
• Game GM 0 : This is the initial game in which A chooses the bit c. Since GM 0 and the real protocol in the ROR model are identical to each other, we have,
• Game GM 
• Game GM 2 : Under this game, the simulations of Send and Hash queries are added so that GM 1 in converted to GM 2 . This game is also modeled as an active attack wherein A eavesdrops all the messages {EID ,
It is worth noticing that the messages involve the random nonces. Therefore, no collision in hash outputs (message digests) occurs when A makes the Hash queries. Using the birthday paradox result, we have,
• Game GM 3 : It is the final game, which implements the CMD(I t MU ) query wherein A can extract all the information {SPW , s } from the lost or stolen device of
MU . Note that SPW = S ⊕ h(PW MU ) ⊕ h(ID MU ||s), S = h(EID ||h(SK HA )) and s = s ⊕ h(ID MU ||PW MU ).
Without having the secret credential s of MU and secret key SK HA of HA, it is computationally difficult for A to guess password PW MU of MU correctly through the send queries. Since the games GM 2 and GM 3 are identical when the password guessing attack is absent, using the Zipf's law on passwords [18] , it follows that (4) where C and s are the Zipf's parameters [18] . Since all the games are executed, it is remained for A to guess the correct bit c. Thus, we have,
Eqs. (1) and (2) give the following result:
Again, Eqs. (5) and (6) produce the following result:
Using the triangular inequality, and Eqs. (3) and (4), we obtain the following: Eqs. (7) and (8) give the following result:
Finally, multiplying both sides of Eq. (9) by a factor of 2, we have,
Hence, the theorem is proved.
B. SECURITY PROOF USING BAN LOGIC
To prove the validity of our authentication scheme, we perform the BAN logic [16] analysis which is well-known as formal security model. First, we define the notations of BAN logic in Table 2 and describe logical postulates of BAN logic. Next, we demonstrate that our proposed scheme can achieves mutual authentication between MU and FA.
1) POSTULATES OF BAN LOGIC
The following postulates of the BAN logic are given below:
1.
Message meaning rule :
2.
Nonce verification rule :
3.
Jurisdiction rule :
4.
Freshness rule :
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5.
Believe rule :
In order to perform the analytic procedures of BAN logic, we first list the verification goals and idealized form of our proposed scheme. After that, to analyze the proposed scheme, we make the initial state assumptions and demonstrate that our proposed scheme can achieve the secure mutual authentication.
2) GOALS
We have the following goals related to our proposed scheme:
The idealized forms of the messages are as follows:
4) ASSUMPTIONS
We make the following assumptions in the BAN logic proof:
HA |≡ (HA
The main proof consists of the following steps:
Step 1: According to Msg 1 , we could get:
Step 2: From S 1 and assumption A 1 , we apply the message meaning rule to obtain:
Step 3: From S 2 and A 2 , we apply the freshness rule to obtain:
Step 4: According to S 2 and S 3 , we apply the nonce verification rule:
Step 5: From S 4 , we apply the believe rule to obtain:
Step 6: According to Msg 2 , we could get:
Step 7: From S 6 and A 3 , we apply the message meaning rule to obtain:
Step 8: From S 6 and A 4 , we apply the freshness rule to obtain:
Step 9: According to S 7 and S 6 , we apply the nonce verification rule to obtain:
Step 10: According to Msg 3 , we could get:
Step 11: From S 10 and A 5 , we apply the message meaning rule to obtain:
Step 12: From S 11 and A 6 , we apply the freshness rule to obtain:
Step 13: According to S 12 and S 11 , we apply the nonce verification rule to obtain:
Step 14: According to Msg 4 , we could get:
Step 15: From S 14 and assumption A 7 , we apply the message meaning rule to obtain:
Step 16: From S 15 and A 8 , we apply the freshness rule to obtain:
Step 17: According to S 16 and S 15 , we apply the nonce verification rule:
Step 18: From S 17 , we apply the believe rule to obtain:
Step 19: According to Msg 5 , we could get:
Step 20: From S 19 and assumption A 7 , we apply the message meaning rule to obtain:
Step 21: From S 15 and A 1 , we apply the freshness rule to obtain:
Step 22: According to S 21 and S 20 , we apply the nonce verification rule:
Step 23: Because of the session key
||S), according to S 5 , S 9 , S 13 , S 18 and S 22 we could get :
Step 24: According to S 23 and A 10 , we apply the jurisdiction rule to obtain:
Step 25: According to S 24 and A 11 , we apply the jurisdiction rule to obtain:
) From the goals 1-4, it is clear that our proposed scheme can achieve mutual authentication between MU and FA.
C. INFORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we perform an informal analysis of our proposed scheme to demonstrate that it is secure against various attacks such as offline password guessing, user impersonation, replay and privileged-insider attacks. We also show that our scheme provides perfect forward secrecy, secure password altered phase and secure mutual authentication.
1) OFFLINE PASSWORD GUESSING ATTACK
In our proposed scheme, an adversary MU a can try to guess the password of MU . To guess an password of MU correctly, MU a can know the value h(MU ID ||s) however MU a cannot know values MU ID and h(MU ID ||s). Therefore, our proposed scheme can resist offline password guessing attack.
2) USER IMPERSONATION ATTACK
If an adversary MU a attempts to impersonate mobile user MU , MU a must know the password of MU correctly. However, according to section V-C.1, MU a cannot know the password of MU . As a result, since the MU a cannot generate authentication request messages, our proposed scheme can prevent user impersonation attack.
3) REPLAY ATTACK
We assume that an adversary MU a can know the messages transmitted in previous session and wants to access to the foreign agent FA.
To access the roaming service, MU a may resend the previous authentication request message {EID , V M , Q M , N M } and receives the response messages {V F2 , Q F2 , N F2 } from FA. However, MU a cannot computes S new because MU a cannot know the value S. In addition, N M and N F2 are changed in every session. Therefore, since MU a cannot authenticate with FA, the proposed scheme can resist replay attack.
4) PERFECT FORWARD SECRECY
We assume that MU a intercepts and stores messages transmitted in the previous session, and SK FA is compromised by MU a . In our scheme, the session key K MF = h(N M ||N F ||S) and MU a can attempt to compute previous session key. However, MU a cannot retrieve N F because MU a cannot know the shared secret key k FA between FA and HA. For this reason, MU a cannot compute K MF = h(N M ||N F ||S) and our proposed scheme can provide perfect forward secrecy.
5) SECURE PASSWORD ALTERED PHASE
In our scheme, we suppose that an adversary MU a wants to change the password of MU . However, since the password altered phase is similar to AESK phase, MU a cannot change the password freely without password of MU . Therefore, our scheme can provide secure password altered phase.
6) SECURE MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION
In our scheme, the values Q F2 = h(EID||S new ||N F2 ) and Q MF = h(N M ||S||N F2 ||S new ) are checked by MU and FA respectively. However, the random number N F2 and N M must use each session. Beside, to compute the session key K MF = h(N M ||N F2 ||S), they must know the value S. Therefore, our proposed scheme can provide secure mutual authentication because the value S only can know FA, MU and HA.
7) PRIVILEGED-INSIDER ATTACK
In a privileged-insider attack, an insider user of a trusted entity being an adversary A tries to defeat the security of the system. This is considered as a serious attack in an authentication scheme [20] , [23] , [24] . Suppose A residing in the HA knows the information {EID} which was delivered to the HA securely during the mobile user registration phase (see Section IV-A.2), where EID = h(ID MU ⊕ PW MU ) ⊕ s and s being a secret random of the mobile user MU . Also, assume that A attains the lost or stolen mobile device of MU after the registration process if finished. Then, A can easily extract all the sensitive information {SPW , s } stored in the device using the power analysis attacks [13] , [14] as described in the threat model (Section I-.1), where
||PW MU ). Now, without having the secret credentials s of MU and secret key SK HA of HA, it is computationally infeasible problem for A to guess ID MU as well as password PW MU of MU , and S correctly. This assures that the proposed scheme is tolerable to the privileged-insider attack.
D. FORMAL SECURITY VERIFICATION USING AVISPA TOOL: SIMULATION STUDY
In this section, the proposed scheme is tested for the formal security verification using the widely-accepted AVISPA tool [17] . AVISPA tool has gained popularity in recent years and has been considered as one of the powerful tool for testing whether a security protocol is safe or unsafe against replay and man-in-the-middle attacks [19] , [20] , [23] - [27] .
In AVISPA, a designed security protocol needs to be implemented using the role-oriented language, called High-Level Protocol Specification Language (HLPSL) [28] . Under the HLPSL, the various basic roles and two other mandatory roles, known as session and environment to be defined. In the HPLSL implementation of the proposed scheme, we have three basic roles: 1) mobileuser for a mobile user (MU ) shown in Figure 8 , 2) homeagent for the home agent shown in Figure 9 and 3) foreignagent for a foreign agent (FA) shown in Figure 10 . The roles for the session and environment are termed as session and environment, respectively. The environment role further contains the secrecy goals under which the protocol becomes secure or insecure. The detailed documentation on AVISPA and its HLPSL specification is available online [17] .
1) DEFINING ROLE SPECIFICATION
Consider the role of a mobile user (MU ) which is implemented in HLPSL in Figure 8 . At first, MU receives the start signal and then makes its initialized state (State = 0) to 1, and sends the registration request message {EID} to HA securely during the mobile user registration phase. After that MU receives the registration reply {S} from MU securely, and updates its state from 2 to 4. During the authentication and establishment of session key (AESK) phase, MU transmits the message channel (using channel(dy)). Here, channel(dy) means the channel is insecure and follow the DY model as discussed in the threat model (Section I-.1). After sending this message, MU declares that he/she has freshly generated random numbers N M and S new for FA, which are reflected in the declarations: 1) witness(MU, FA, mu_fa_nm, Nm') and 2) witness(MU, FA, mu_fa_sn, Sn'). Once MU receives the message {V F2 , Q F2 , N F2 } from FA, the state is changed from 4 to 6. Finally, MU sends the message {Q MF } to FA for mutual authentication purpose. In this role, MU authenticates FA based on the random value N F2 using the declaration request(FA, MU, fa_ha_nf2, Nf2'). In a similar manner, the roles for HA and FA are defined in HLPSL in Figures 9 and 10 .
2) DISCUSSION ON SIMULATION RESULTS
The broadly-used Constraint Logic based Attack Searcher (CL-AtSe) backend has been selected for formal security verification purpose in order to find if there are any attacks on the proposed scheme [17] . For the replay attack checking, VOLUME 5, 2017 CL-AtSe checks if the specified protocol can be executed by the legitimate parties by searching for a passive intruder. The back-end then gives the intruder (which is always denoted by the special symbol i) with information about a few normal sessions between the valid parties. In addition, for the DY model checking, the CL-AtSe also checks if there is any possibility of man-in-the-middle attack by the intruder (i). Note that the intruder (i) has knowledge of all public parameters and can also play a legitimate role in AVISPA protocol execution. For this purpose, the role of the intruder (i) is also included in the role environment as shown in Figure 11 .
The proposed scheme is finally simulated using the SPAN, the Security Protocol ANimator for AVISPA tool [29] for the CL-AtSe backend. The simulation results are organized in the output format (OF), which has the following sections:
• SUMMARY: This section either indicates that the proposed scheme is safe or unsafe or that the analysis is inconclusive.
• DETAILS: This section explains under which the conditions the proposed scheme is safe or when attacks are possible or the reason for an inconclusive analysis.
• BACK-END, GOAL and PROTOCOL: These sections indicate which the backend used to analyze, the goal of the analysis and the name of the protocol, respectively.
• Finally, if an attack is found during the protocol execution, the trace of the attack is also printed in the standard Alice-Bob format with a few statistics and comments.
The simulation results shown in Figure 12 shows that 63 states were analyzed and out of these states, 15 states were reachable. The translation and computation time taken during the execution were 0.09 seconds and 0.36 seconds. The reported simulation results in Figure 12 assure that the proposed scheme is safe against replay and man-in-themiddle attacks.
VI. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
In this section, we compare the performance our proposed scheme with the existing related schemes, such as the schemes of Lee et al. [5] , Mun et al. [6] , and Wu et al. [9] .
A. SECURITY FEATURES COMPARISON
We have analyzed the security properties of our proposed scheme with the related schemes in Table 3 . From this table, it is clear that the existing schemes do not protect various attacks, whereas the proposed scheme is secure against the attacks. Specifically, perfect forward secrecy (SP5) and mutual authentication (SP7) are not supported in the existing schemes. Thus, the proposed scheme provides better security as compared to other schemes of Lee et al. [5] , Mun et al. [6] , and Wu et al. [9] . 
B. COMPUTATION OVERHEAD COMPARISON
For computation overhead comparison, we use the following notations. T h , T XOR , T sym , T asym and T ecm denote the time needed for the one-way hash operation, exclusive-OR operation, symmetric key encryption/decryption, asymmetric key encryption/decryption and an elliptic curve point multiplication, respectively. For rough estimation, we consider the existing experimental results reported by Lee et al. [30] . Lee et al. [30] did an evaluation on a four-core 3.2 GHz machine with 8 GB memory, and the results were averaged over 300 randomized simulation runs. It was mentioned that one symmetric encryption/decryption is at least 100 times faster than one public-key encryption/decryption and one exponential operation is approximately equal to 60 symmetric encryptions/decryptions. Based on the results, T ecm , T sym and T h are 0.063075s seconds, 0.0087 seconds and 0.0005 seconds, respectively [21] , [30] . Then, we have, T asym ≈ 100 T sym ≈ 0.87 seconds. Since exclusive-OR operation is negligible as compared to other operations, it is ignored in the rough estimation calculation. The computation overheads between the proposed scheme and other schemes are shown in Table 4 . It is worth noticing that the computation time needed for the schemes of Lee et al. [5] , Mun et al. [6] , and Wu et al. [9] are 2.6421 seconds, 0.13315 seconds and 0.0095 seconds, respectively, whereas it is 0.0135 seconds for the proposed scheme. It is clear that the proposed scheme is better in term of computation cost as compared to the existing Wu et al.'s scheme [9] and Mun et al.'s scheme [6] . Though Lee et al.'s scheme [5] needs little less computation cost as compared to the proposed scheme, our scheme provides better security as compared to other schemes.
C. COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD COMPARISON
For communication overhead comparison, we assume that identity of an entity, timestamp, random nonce/secret, hash output (if we apply Secure Hash Standard (SHA-1) algorithm [31] ), elliptic curve point P = (P x , P y ) and ciphertext using public key cryptosystem (if we apply RSA public key cryptosystem [32] ) are 160 bits, 32 bits, 128 bits, 160 bits, (160+160) = 320 bits and 1024 bits, respectively. In addition, |Cert FA | and |Cert HA | represent the bit lengths in the certificates Cert FA of FA and Cert HA of HA, respectively. In the proposed scheme, the messages
and {Q MF } need (160 + 160 + 160 + 128) = 608 bits, (160 + 160 + 160 + 128 + 160 + 128) = 896 bits, max{(160 + 160 + 160), 160} = 480 bits, (160 + 160 + 128) = 448 bits and 160 bits, respectively. Thus, the total communication overhead for five messages transmission is (608 + 896 + 480 + 448 + 160) = 2592 bits. The results shown in Table 5 indicate that the communication overhead of the proposed scheme is comparable with that for Mun et al.'s scheme [6] and Lee et al.'s scheme [5] , whereas it is much better than that for Wu et al.'s scheme [9] .
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we demonstrated that Lee et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to various attacks such as offline password guessing and impersonation attacks, and then we showed that it cannot provide perfect forward secrecy, secure mutual authentication and secure password altered phase. To overcome these security weaknesses, we have presented an improved secure anonymous authentication protocol for roaming service in GLOMONETs. The proposed scheme can prevent offline password guessing, user impersonation and replay attacks, and our scheme can provide perfect forward secrecy, secure password altered phase and secure mutual authentication using secret key k FA between FA and HA. We also demonstrated that our scheme can provide secure mutual authentication between MU and FA using BAN logic. Moreover, we compared the performances and security properties with related schemes. Therefore, our proposed scheme is more secure than related schemes, and can be applicable to roaming services in GLOMONETs. 
